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The Effect of Audit Standards on Fraud Consultation and Auditor Judgment 
 
ABSTRACT: We investigate how the strictness of a requirement to consult on potential client 
fraud affects auditor assessments of fraud risk and the propensity to consult with firm experts. 
We test two specific forms of guidance about fraud consultations: (1) relatively strict (i.e., 
mandatory and binding) and (2) relatively lenient (i.e., advisory and non-binding). We predict 
that a strict consultation requirement will lead to greater propensity to consult and higher fraud 
risk assessments. We further investigate potentially amplifying effects of a client attribute 
(underlying fraud risk) and an engagement attribute (deadline pressure). Results from two 
experiments with 208 Dutch audit managers and partners demonstrate that fraud risk and the 
consultation propensity are both assessed higher under a strict consultation requirement. For 
near-partners and partners, this effect is compounded when a client exhibits significant red flags; 
for managers, it is compounded when deadline pressure is tight. This study demonstrates that the 
formulation of a standard, such as the consultation requirement, may create adverse incentives 
that bias risk assessment, which should be considered by regulators and audit firms when 
developing, formulating and implementing such procedures. 
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The Effect of Audit Standards on Fraud Consultation and Auditor Judgment 
I. INTRODUCTION 
All major audit firms have established technical departments to consult with field 
auditors about issues in the audit, which reflect heightened risk or are technically complex 
(Gibbins and Emby 1985; Gibbins and Mason 1988; Salterio 1994). Such consultations may be 
desirable when a client has undertaken material and complex transactions (e.g., mergers or 
financial derivatives), there are significant valuation issues (e.g., impairment of goodwill), 
questions arise as to the ability of the client to continue as a going concern (Salterio and Denham 
1997), or there are indications of potential financial statement fraud. While consultation is 
usually encouraged as a matter of firm policy, the extent of consultation is often left to the 
discretion of individual auditors (Salterio and Denham 1997). Recent accounting scandals, 
however, have led to more formal rules about audit team consultations regarding the possibility 
of fraud (AICPA 2004; IFAC 2004).  
In the Netherlands, ISA 240 (IFAC 2004) has been expanded to include a requirement 
that an auditor consult with technical experts when a client exhibits indications of potential fraud 
(NIVRA 2007). The purpose of the new requirement is to increase the likelihood of identifying 
fraudulent behavior and to improve the adequacy of subsequent actions, such as planning of 
additional audit procedures to further investigate indications of potential fraud. However, the 
Dutch standard on fraud consultation does not specify the manner in which the consultation 
procedures should be implemented and firms are allowed flexibility in structuring their 
procedures. At one extreme, the consultation requirement could be relatively strict, mandating 
the field auditor to consult and act on the advice of the expert consulted (i.e., mandatory and 
binding). At the other extreme, the consultation requirement could be relatively lenient, allowing 
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the field auditor to decide whether or not to consult or act on the advice of the expert (i.e., 
advisory and non-binding).  
At the time of this study, Dutch audit firms were in the process of transitioning their 
fraud consultation procedures to comply with the new standard. From interviews with partners at 
all participating firms and open-ended questions in the experimental survey, we learned that 
there was a noticeable variance in perceptions of how strictly the consultation requirement would 
be enforced. Further, some auditors had received rudimentary training concerning the general 
requirement but with limited firm-specific details, especially whether advice from a consultant 
should be considered binding. Thus, we conclude that the topic was salient to our participants but 
implementation of the new standard was not yet fully developed, resulting in a diversity in 
practice that would be expected to narrow as firm policies became more settled. These conditions 
provided a unique window of opportunity to study different interpretations of the new standard.  
In this study, we investigate whether the strictness of the consultation requirement will 
affect an auditor’s willingness to consult with a technical expert and the assessment of fraud risk. 
It is desirable that a strict standard on fraud consultation would increase the likelihood of such 
consultations taking place. However, it is also possible that the mere strictness of the standard 
might cause auditors to strategically or subconsciously alter their assessment of fraud risk at a 
client. The latter effect would not be desirable since it suggests a biased interpretation of audit 
evidence, which can lead to over-auditing. While detecting fraud is a highly desired objective of 
the audit, the efficiency of audits is also important.1 If the strictness of standards causes an 
auditor to systematically overstate the riskiness of a client, it is likely that a sizable loss of 
efficiency can occur across a portfolio of clients. In addition, we examine the potentially 
                                                 
1
 The PCAOB recently announced that they would consider audit efficiency as part of their audit inspection process: 
“In 2006, the Board will focus its inspections of ICFR on whether firms efficiently achieved the objectives of an 
ICFR audit” (PCAOB 2006).  
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moderating or amplifying effects of a client-related variable (i.e., underlying fraud risk) and an 
engagement-related variable (i.e., deadline pressure). We predict that the effect of requirement 
strictness on consultation propensity and fraud risk assessment will be strongest when underlying 
fraud risk is high and deadline pressure is severe. Finally, we explore whether the predicted 
relationships vary across ranks (i.e., partners and senior managers versus managers). 
We conducted two experiments with 208 experienced Dutch auditors from three Big-
Four firms and one medium-sized audit firm. Participants assumed the role of audit partner and 
read a description of a potentially fraudulent client issue that has been detected in the final stages 
of the audit. In both experiments, the consultation requirement was manipulated as being either 
strict (i.e., mandatory and binding) or lenient (i.e., advisory and non-binding). In Experiment 1, 
underlying fraud risk was manipulated (high or low); in Experiment 2, deadline pressure was 
manipulated (high or low). 
In general, auditors’ consultation propensity was positively affected by the strictness of 
the consultation requirement, demonstrating the effectiveness of a stricter formulation of the 
standard. Fraud risk assessment was also positively affected by the strictness manipulation, and 
results of mediation analysis suggest that the effect of the strictness of the consultation 
requirement on fraud risk assessment is mediated by participants’ consultation propensity. This 
implies that participants increase their fraud risk assessment in order to justify an increased 
propensity to consult—a potentially undesired consequence of the new standard. The effect of 
the strictness of the consultation requirement was conditional on both the underlying fraud risk 
of a client and deadline pressure, however, these effects varied across different auditor ranks: (1) 
partners and senior managers (near-partners) increased their fraud risk assessment and propensity 
to consult in response to an increased strictness of the consultation requirement only when 
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extensive red flags were present while managers increased their propensity to consult in response 
to a stricter requirement regardless of the level of underlying fraud risk, (2) managers increased 
their fraud risk assessments in response to deadline pressure but partners and near-partners 
reduced their fraud risk assessments, and (3) the positive effect of consultation requirement 
strictness on the propensity to consult was strengthened by deadline pressure (as predicted) for 
managers only.2 
The next section provides background, theory and hypotheses development. Section 3 
describes the experiment and methodology used to test hypotheses. Section 4 offers the results, 
and Section 5 presents a summary of the research, conclusions and limitations. 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES  
Consultation with colleagues about difficult issues during the course of an engagement is 
considered to be an integral component of the audit process (Gibbins and Emby 1985, Gibbins 
and Mason 1988, Salterio and Denham 1997). Gibbins and Emby (1985) report that over 90% of 
the auditors participating in their study said they consulted with others during or after the audit 
process, however, they use the term ‘consultation’ very broadly to include informal talks with 
colleagues. Danos et al. (1989) found that audit partners rarely refer questions to a formal 
consultation unit, but when they do, they consider the resulting advice to be very important. 
Salterio and Denham (1997) studied consultation units at large Canadian audit firms and 
observed several differences in the units’ ability to act as a source of organizational memory for 
their firms. In particular, audit firms varied considerably with respect to (1) the extent of 
resources allocated to a consultation unit, (2) the organizational structure of such a unit, (3) 
                                                 
2
 Deadline pressure did not exacerbate the strictness effect on fraud risk assessment because all auditors increased 
their fraud risk assessment in response to a stricter requirement. 
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integration of the unit into the firms’ culture, and (4) the extent to which consultation with the 
unit is mandatory. The latter finding is particularly relevant for the current study. 
Experimental studies have shown that auditors make better decisions when they 
anticipate consultation will require them to justify their decisions (e.g., Ashton 1990; Johnson 
and Kaplan 1991; Kennedy 1993). However, the same line of research also reveals that 
consultation may cause auditors to try to accommodate others’ preferences (e.g., Peecher 1996). 
Other (non-audit) studies have examined what decision-makers do after consulting with 
colleagues and found they often ignore nonbinding advice with which they disagree, i.e., they 
tend to stick to their own previously held positions (Beck et al. 1996; Sniezek and Buckley 
1995). Kennedy et al. (1997) found that auditors’ decisions are judged to be more justifiable 
when advice has been sought, and perceived justifiability is greatest when the auditor and 
consultant are in agreement. Asare and Wright (2004) is the only study we are aware of that 
examines the propensity to consult with technical experts. They viewed consultation propensity 
as a measure of the effectiveness of fraud detection responses and found that inherent risk and 
auditors’ fraud risk assessments are positively associated with the desire to consult.  
Prior research on auditors’ consultation practices does not provide much insight into 
auditors’ preferences toward consultation with specialists. There are reasons to believe that some 
auditors generally wish to retain decision control and avoid consultation if possible. One such 
reason could be that auditors generally view consultation as an abdication of decision power to 
others, which may not be compatible with their view of their own professional status or 
expertise. Also, during an engagement, auditors (especially at higher ranks) are constantly 
confronted with efficiency demands, causing them to avoid unnecessary cost and time overruns. 
Faced with such demands, they may perceive that consultation could lead to additional work that 
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they may feel is unnecessary. Thus, efficiency constraints may be a reason for auditors to retain 
decision control and avoid consultation. Asare and Wright (2004) point out that an auditor may 
reduce his/her assessment of fraud risk in order to avoid incurring the costs of consultation or 
missing important engagement deadlines.  
Alternatively, there are also reasons to believe that an auditor may be generally motivated 
to share decision responsibility with others. For example, prior research suggests that auditors 
may be motivated to consult to justify their decisions and/or to increase confidence of others in 
their decisions (Heath and Gonzalez 1995). In a highly sensitive fraud context, auditors may also 
consult for fear of being held accountable for potentially erroneous decisions. Involving a 
technical expert may, in the auditors’ perception, insulate them from some negative 
repercussions if a given situation is misjudged or handled poorly. Kennedy et al. (1997) suggest 
that auditors may consult in order to shift responsibility for sensitive decisions to others. These 
explanations suggest that auditors can be motivated to share decision responsibility with fraud 
specialists. Regardless of auditors’ predisposition to consultation (which may vary across 
auditors), we suggest that the manner in which a consultation requirement is formulated will 
affect auditors’ judgments. 
In general, the audit profession sees auditors’ consultation practices as desirable. For 
example, ISA 220 requires auditors to “consult on difficult or contentious matters” (IFAC 2005: 
265). In the Netherlands, a corresponding standard has recently been developed to deal with 
indicators of fraud (NIVRA 2007). It requires auditors to consult with technical experts upon 
detection of fraud indicators, which could lead to material misstatements. If such indicators exist, 
the auditor should discuss the observed issue with a technical expert within the firm, who then 
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offers guidance concerning the necessary measures to be taken (such as modifying the extent, 
nature and timing of substantive testing) and helps to determine the likelihood of fraud. 
Strictness of the Consultation Requirement  
The exact implementation of the consultation requirement under the Dutch auditing 
standard was left to the discretion of firms. At the time of this study, Dutch audit firms were in a 
transition period regarding the extent to which they had adjusted and communicated their fraud 
consultation procedures. Given the potential flexibility in implementing the consultation 
standard, we investigate whether auditor judgments and decisions are affected by alternative 
formulations of the requirement. On one hand, the standard can be strictly implemented, 
requiring the auditor to accept and act on the advice of the expert consulted (i.e., consultation is 
mandatory and binding). This form of consultation would essentially result in mandatory sharing 
of responsibility for subsequent actions with the expert. Another possibility is that consultation 
can be leniently implemented, allowing the auditor to decide him/herself whether or not to 
consult in the first place and subsequently act on the advice of the expert (i.e., consultation is 
advisory and non-binding). This form of consultation would allow the field auditor to retain 
responsibility for subsequent decisions and actions.3  
In this study, we assume a situation in which the auditor comes across a potential 
misstatement during the audit, which could be caused by either error or fraud. Given the Dutch 
fraud consultation standard, consultation with a specialist would be warranted if the irregularity 
were due to a fraudulent act—i.e., a fraud indicator. In our first hypothesis, we examine whether 
                                                 
3
 We recognize that the mandatory/lenient consultation requirement can be viewed as a different conceptual 
construct from the binding/nonbinding nature of advice. In this study, we combine the two theoretically independent 
constructs into a single manipulation. We have deliberately chosen to consider the extreme cases of the combined 
construct (i.e., mandatory and binding versus advisory and non-binding) because, based on discussions with Dutch 
practitioners, it would be illogical to implement the other combinations. First, an originally advisory consultation is 
unlikely to become binding at a later stage. Second, once a consultation is mandatory it is unrealistic to assume that 
it will be viewed as non-binding. We review the limitations of this choice in the discussion section.  
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auditors’ willingness to consult with an expert is affected by the strictness of the standard given 
an ambiguous situation. Based on the potential future sanctions that non-compliance would entail 
when consultation is mandatory and binding (i.e., strict), we suggest that auditors will indicate a 
higher propensity to consult under a strict standard as compared to a lenient formulation. 
Furthermore, we also predict that a stricter standard formulation will simultaneously increase 
auditors’ fraud risk assessment—an unjustified effect, since the cause of the potential 
misstatement remains equally ambiguous, regardless of the way the standard is implemented.  
We suggest that auditors’ heightened consultation propensity in light of a strict standard 
creates a motivation to increase the assessment of fraud risk. On one hand, this motivation could 
be a type of bias, such that auditors unknowingly evaluate the description of the irregularity 
differently, because they have a preexisting preference to consult due to the strictness of the 
standard. The psychology literature refers to such a bias as motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990; 
Pyszcynski and Greenberg 1987) or predecisional distortion of evidence (Russo et al. 1996, 
1998, 2000; Wilks 2002).4 For instance, auditors might unconsciously perceive the issue as more 
salient because the strictness of the standard emphasizes the importance of taking fraud 
seriously, and therefore assess the risk of fraud higher. On the other hand, the motivation to 
increase fraud risk assessment due to a stricter standard could be a strategic choice by the auditor 
to justify transferring responsibility for the issue to a consulting expert. As demonstrated 
extensively in prior accounting research (e.g., Agoglia et al. 2003; Gibbins and Newton 1994; 
Peecher 1996; Waller and Felix 1984), auditors indeed incorporate justification goals when they 
                                                 
4
 Several studies confirm that the theories of predecisional distortion and motivated reasoning apply to auditor 
judgment. For instance, in a study by Peecher (1996), auditors assigned higher likelihoods to a client’s non-error 
explanations of income-increasing account balance fluctuations when they were instructed to utilize clients’ insights 
to increase audit efficiency. Similarly, senior auditors were found to interpret ambiguous standards in ways that 
supported client-preferred accounting methods (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996). Wilks (2002) observed that 
subordinate auditors distort audit evidence to be consistent with the known opinions of a supervisor who was to 
evaluate the subordinate. Beeler and Hunton (2002) demonstrated that auditors’ initial desire to maintain an audit 
client biased their evaluation of subsequent audit evidence in evaluating a client as a going concern. 
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perceive that their decisions will require support in the future, sometimes to the extent that 
judgment will be biased. For example, most audits are now subject to ex-post quality review, 
either by external regulators or internal peers. An internal review will examine issues of audit 
efficiency as well as effectiveness (IFAC 2006; PCAOB 2006; 2009), so an auditor that wishes 
to call in a technical expert may feel the need to increase their assessment of fraud risk in order 
to justify such a consultation at a later date. That is, a quality reviewer may find it hard to 
question the field auditor’s assessment of fraud risk when the consultation appears justified, 
especially compared to a situation where fraud risk is assessed as low and a consultant is called 
in anyway. This perspective leads to our first hypothesis:   
H1: Ceteris paribus, auditors will rate consultation propensity and fraud risk higher 
when the consultation requirement is strict than when it is lenient. 
The reasoning leading to Hypothesis 1 raises a related question, namely, whether the 
increase in fraud risk assessment is a direct or mediated effect. That is, the strictness of the 
standard could cause the auditor to increase his or her propensity to consult, which leads to a 
proportional increase in the fraud risk assessment to justify a greater willingness to consult. In 
this case, the effect of the standard on the fraud risk assessment would be mediated by the 
change in propensity to consult. Alternatively, an increase in an auditor’s propensity to consult 
may not be proportional to any effects on the fraud risk assessment. In this case, the effects on 
the standard on fraud risk and consultation are separate. To examine if the effect in Hypothesis 1 
is mediated by propensity to consult we examine the following research question:  
RQ1: Does the positive effect of the strictness of the consultation requirement on 
propensity to consult mediate the effect of the standard on the fraud risk 
assessment? 
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Underlying Fraud Risk 
In addition to the hypothesized main effects of the strictness of the consultation 
requirement on consultation propensity and fraud risk assessment, we also examine whether the 
predicted effect in H1 relates to the attributes of a client. We specifically consider whether the 
extent of “red flags” (i.e., underlying fraud risk) alters the impact of the strictness of the standard 
on the judgments of auditors. As part of the planning stage of an audit, auditors are required to 
make an initial fraud risk assessment based on risk factors (red flags) found in the so-called fraud 
triangle (SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2004) and ISA 240 (IFAC 2004)): management’s attitudes (e.g., 
risk seeking), opportunities (e.g., presence or absence of internal controls), and incentives (e.g., 
meet or beat expectations). The assessment of fraud is a highly sensitive area and subject to 
much professional attention in the wake of the accounting and auditing scandals of the past 
decade. Thus, the underlying fraud risk of a client might influence how an auditor responds to 
the consultation requirement since a client that has strong indications of fraud may be perceived 
differently than a client with only weak indications.  
We suggest that the underlying fraud risk amplifies the previously described effect of the 
strictness of the consultation requirement on consultation propensity and fraud risk assessment. 
For a client that has a large number of red flags that are fairly obvious, non-compliance with a 
strict standard might result in serious repercussions for an auditor if the engagement is examined 
ex post. In this situation, the strictness effect on consultation propensity and assessed fraud risk 
could be greater.5 On the other hand, when the client displays fewer red flags, the strictness of 
the consultation requirement is expected to have a weaker effect, since the issue would be 
evaluated as less serious ex post. In other words, under low underlying fraud risk, the auditor 
                                                 
5
 Also, when underlying fraud risk is high, the fraud explanation for the observed irregularity may appear more 
salient and probable to the auditor, which may cause a main effect of underlying fraud risk on fraud risk assessment 
(not predicted). 
 13
would not perceive the need to consult (and hence, to justify this decision) as strongly, even 
when the requirement to consult is strict. Thus, the combination of a strict consultation 
requirement and high underlying fraud risk will result in the greatest propensity to consult and 
the highest fraud risk assessments, leading to our second hypothesis: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the positive effect of the strictness of the consultation 
requirement on consultation propensity and fraud risk assessment will be greater 
when underlying fraud risk is high. 
Deadline Pressure 
Finally, we consider whether the effect in H1 is influenced by an engagement attribute, 
namely the extent of deadline pressure imposed at the time the consultation decision is being 
made. Deadline pressure arises when a decision maker must act within an imposed timeline. 
Deadlines in auditing are quite common, often dictating when specific actions and decisions 
must be completed (DeZoort and Lord 1997). Researchers generally agree that auditors are often 
faced with a difficult compromise between the conflicting goals of audit quality and engagement 
management (e.g., Cohen and Trompeter 1998; McNair 1991), and prior audit research confirms 
that time pressure may lead to impaired audit decisions (see DeZoort and Lord 1997 for a 
review). For example, time pressure related to both deadlines and budgets can result in premature 
signoffs of audit program steps without the auditors actually having performed the work 
(Alderman and Deitrick 1982; Otley and Pierce 1996; Pierce and Sweeney 2004).6 McDaniel 
(1990) observed that the effectiveness of auditors’ performance during an error detection task 
was reduced under high levels of time pressure. Aside from such audit quality threatening 
behaviors, time budget pressure has also been found to cause under-reporting of time (e.g., 
Kelley and Margheim 1990). Houston (1999) found that auditors reduce risk assessments and 
                                                 
6
 While we acknowledge that there is a difference between deadline pressure and time budget pressure (see DeZoort 
and Lord 1997), we argue that their presence likely leads to similar dysfunctional decisions, as both are related to 
pressures of complying with time targets. 
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planned sample sizes in the planning phase of the audit in response to time pressure. Finally, 
Glover (1997) found that time pressure focuses auditors’ attention more on diagnostic, and less 
on nondiagnostic, cues—a reduction of a phenomenon known in the literature as the ‘dilution 
effect’.  
We argue that deadline pressure will amplify the effect of the strictness of the 
consultation requirement on auditors’ willingness to consult because a tight deadline may 
provide the auditor an additional incentive to consult, particularly when the requirement to 
consult is strict. More specifically, under high deadline pressure and a strict consultation 
requirement, bringing in a consultant may justify potential delays that would be harder to explain 
if the auditor chose not to consult. Given that the auditor is formally required to consult, these 
activities may be a professionally acceptable reason for missing deadlines and the cost of extra 
audit effort may be recoverable from the client. When the requirement is lenient, the incentive to 
respond to tighter deadline pressure is weaker, because a delay due to consultation will be more 
difficult to justify ex-post, given that consultation was not mandatory in the first place. 7 Finally, 
under low deadline pressure, we expect the effect of the strictness of the consultation 
requirement to be relatively weaker because the additional incentive to consult is absent. Again, 
following from the above reasoning (H1), fraud risk assessment should similarly be more 
strongly affected by the strictness of the consultation requirement when deadline pressure is 
high.8 Thus, we expect that the effect of the strictness of the consultation requirement will be 
greatest when deadlines are imminent, leading to our third hypothesis: 
                                                 
7
 In addition, it is possible that under a lenient consultation requirement, deadline pressure will have a slightly 
negative effect on auditors’ propensity to consult, because under such circumstances, tight deadline pressure may 
provide an incentive to finalize the audit as soon as possible and hence, not engage in consultation activities.  
8
 With respect to fraud risk assessment, one may also consider an alternative prediction. Assuming that the strictness 
to consult is a nondiagnostic cue during the assessment of fraud risk, high deadline pressure should reduce auditors’ 
focus on this standard-related aspect (Glover 1997). 
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H3: Ceteris paribus, the positive effect of the strictness of the consultation 
requirement on consultation propensity and fraud risk assessment will be greater 
when deadline pressure is high. 
Rank effects 
An encounter with fraud at a client is both a rare event (Montgomery et al. 2002; Pany 
and Whittington 2001) and one that has a potentially significant impact on the conduct and 
outcome of an audit. Because of their relative differences in experience and their role in the audit 
firm, it is possible that managers and partners will not respond in the same way to fraud 
indicators. Partners, having more experience to judge the significant of fraud indicators, as well 
as being the owners of the firm who share in profits and exposure to potential losses from 
litigation if a client turns out to be fraudulent, may look at the new standard on consultation 
differently than managers. On their part, managers have less experience with which to judge the 
significance of a fraud indicator. Further, most managers have the ambition to become partners, 
do not share in the litigation exposure of the firm, and may feel that their performance will be 
judged primarily on their ability to complete an engagement on time and under budget. These 
differences suggest that partners and managers may not react to the strictness of the standard in 
the same way when fraud indicators exist in an engagement. This lead to our second research 
question regarding differential reactions by managers and partners to variations in the strictness 
of the standard, underlying client fraud risk and deadline pressure:  
RQ2: Do managers and partners differ with regard to how they respond to the strictness 
of the consultation requirement, underlying fraud risk and deadline pressure? 
 
 16
III. RESEARCH METHOD 
Design 
We conducted two experiments both of which were a between-subjects 2x2 factorial 
design with 4 treatment groups. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the strictness of the 
consultation requirement (mandatory and binding, advised and non-binding) and underlying 
client fraud risk (high, low). In Experiment 2, we manipulated consultation requirement 
strictness and deadline pressure (high, low). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
eight treatment conditions. Materials were provided to the participants and sealed in envelopes 
when completed (see further details below). 
Participants 
Participants were managers, senior managers (near-partners), and partners of three Big-
Four public accounting firms and one medium-sized firm in the Netherlands. Managers, senior 
managers, and partners were chosen to participate because the ultimate decision to consult with 
technical experts commonly lies with them.9 The experiment was administered during the firms’ 
annual training sessions in 2007. Participants were attending their respective firm’s training 
sessions and voluntarily participated in this study in exchange for one CPE credit and the 
donation of €2.50 to a charity fund of their choice. 
Procedure and Treatments 
Participants assumed the role of the partner on the audit of a medium-sized client in the 
office furniture industry. The case used in the experiment described a specific, but ambiguous, 
set of conditions in the company that might be fraudulent. The facts of this condition were the 
                                                 
9
 Descriptive statistics demonstrate that all experiment participants have relatively high levels of public accounting 
and consultation experience. 
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same for all versions of the experiment (see below). The consultation requirement and the 
manipulation of strictness were presented prior to the case description. Participants in the ‘strict 
requirement’ condition were told that consultation with a technical expert when fraud indicators 
are detected is mandatory, that any advice received would be binding, and that additional testing 
must be reviewed by the expert. Participants in the ‘lenient requirement’ condition were told that 
they would decide themselves whether to seek advice from a technical expert or not, that any 
advice received would not be binding, and further review by the expert would not be required. 
This manipulation was the same for Experiment 1 and 2. 
In Experiment 1, the description of the client background and history included indications 
of the underlying fraud risk (i.e., extent of red flags), which was manipulated by varying 
opportunity, attitude and pressure factors for the client company (see Apostolou et al. 2001; 
Asare and Wright 2004; Hackenbrack 1993; Ng et al. 2001; Wilks and Zimbelman 2004). For 
example, in the high (low) underlying fraud risk condition, management’s focus on internal 
controls was described as strong (limited), the client has some (no) history of aggressive 
accounting, and many (few) audit adjustment have been proposed in prior year audits. The 
impact of deadline pressure was tested in Experiment 2 by manipulating the time available to 
report the results of the audit to a bank as being either eight days or three months.10  
                                                 
10
 We deliberately chose to test the moderating effects of underlying fraud risk and deadline pressure separately, 
rather than running a full-factorial 2x2x2 design. The reason for this choice is that we are primarily interested in 
how client and engagement attributes moderate the effect of the standard formulation. We did not intend to provide 
an exhaustive test of such conditions but, rather, to simply demonstrate that such conditions might influence how an 
auditor responds to a new standard. Our current approach does not allow us to test the three-way interaction among 
the strictness of the standard, deadline pressure, and underlying fraud risk. Our purpose was to show the moderating 
effect of such conditions, not to test their absolute effect. Further, we were concerned that the three-way interaction 
would result in a ceiling effect given that we expect amplifying effects for the moderating variables. In order for our 
test of underlying fraud risk (red flags) to be meaningful, we needed to create a case where fraud was possible even 
in the “low” condition. As a result, we had to make a design choice between not finding our main effects of interest 
because fraud risk was too low (and not salient) and being able to test for a three-way interaction, which would 
suffer from a ceiling effect. 
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Participants in both experiments then received key financial figures for the client and 
information about the potentially fraudulent conditions in the company (i.e., a fraud indicator). 
The conditions related to a discrepancy in the client’s inventory. Specifically, participants were 
told that there is a heightened risk that products had been shipped to customers without being 
invoiced due to problems with the automation of the inventory system. This problem could 
potentially lead to overstated inventory and understated sales. Further, the participants were told 
that different personnel in the company had offered two competing explanations for the 
inventory discrepancies: (1) the warehouse manager insinuates that discrepancies might be the 
result of intentional manipulation11 and (2) the CFO claims that problems are due to 
implementation of a new ERP system.12  
Dependent Variables 
Participants were asked to rate the likelihood of fraud and to indicate the likelihood they 
would consult with an expert. Fraud risk was assessed in response to the following question: “In 
your opinion, what is the probability that the described 2006 audit issue is an indicator of 
material fraud?” (0% = very low, 100% = very high). Consultation propensity was measured by 
asking participants the following question: “What is the probability that you would consult with 
an expert of your firm’s technical department on the described audit issue?” (0% = very low, 
100% = very high). Participants then placed the first part of the materials in an envelope and 
sealed the envelope. A second envelope contained a debriefing questionnaire including 
                                                 
11
 Such conditions are often associated with kickbacks or other illegal payments. 
12
 Five accounting faculty and four audit partners reviewed the instrument for realism, reasonableness, and length. 
Thirty-five Big-Four auditors pilot-tested the instrument for the clarity of the task and related questions, 
manipulation effectiveness, and completeness of information. We made some revisions to the case materials based 
on comments received and pilot results. 
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manipulation checks, covariate measurement, and demographic questions. At the end of the 
session, the experiment administrator collected both envelopes. 
IV. RESULTS 
Sample 
During 13 sessions, a total of 102 Dutch auditors participated in Experiment 1, and 106 
participated in Experiment 2. The average participant was 40 years old and had 17 years of 
public accounting experience (ranging from 5 to 44 years). Of the total sample of 208 auditors, 
182 (87.5%) were male. There were 65 partners, 51 senior managers (also referred to in this 
paper as “near-partners”), and 92 managers, of which 163 worked at one of the three Big-Four 
firms, while the medium-sized firm employed 45. Further, 121 auditors (58.2%) had experienced 
management fraud (i.e., fraudulent financial reporting) and 168 participants (80.8%) had 
experienced employee fraud (i.e., misappropriation of assets) during an audit at least once during 
their career.13 Only 20.9% of the total sample had used their firms’ technical office for 
consultation on fraud-related matters, while the majority of participants (84.7%) had inquired for 
advice on other audit-related issues at least once.14 
Testing of our hypotheses requires that all participating auditors are knowledgeable about 
consultation and have sufficiently high levels of experience. Table 1 offers detailed descriptive 
statistics on various experience-related dimensions across auditor ranks (Panels A and B) and 
                                                 
13
 Research in the US has generally suggested that few auditors encounter conditions of fraudulent financial 
reporting during their careers (Montgomery et al. 2002; Pany and Whittington 2001). Our demographic results 
reveal that a majority of the participants in this study have previously encountered either management or employee 
fraud. According to prior research on Dutch auditors’ fraud experiences and perceptions (Hassink et al. 2003, 2005), 
there is a clear distinction between material and immaterial fraud regarding the steps to be taken in response to fraud 
detection. Auditors’ exposure to immaterial cases of fraud may be relatively frequent, but since little action is taken 
in most such cases, they will likely not be made known to the public. 
14 We compared the samples for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 on all demographic variables. The only variable on 
which the two samples differ marginally (p<0.10) is years of public accounting experience (18.01 years on average 
in Experiment 1 versus 16.06 years in Experiment 2). None of the other demographic factors differ significantly 
across the two experiment samples. Given the relatively high level of experience of our participants, we do not 
consider the difference between 18 years and 16 years experience to be of practical significance.  
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firm types (Panels C and D) and largely confirms this assumption. First, public accounting 
experience differs across the three ranks as would be expected. However, we observe that even 
‘junior’ managers have extensive public accounting experience (12.54 years). Partners have 
significantly more experience with management fraud and fraud consultation than ‘junior’ 
managers and senior managers, but there is no difference between the two manager ranks. There 
is no significant difference across ranks when it comes to consultation experience about general 
audit issues. With regard to firm size, Big-Four auditors are somewhat younger and have 
somewhat less experience in public accounting and audit consultation than medium-sized 
auditors; however, these differences are minor and both groups hold extensive experience in both 
auditing and consultation. Hence, we conclude that the sample meets our study criteria of high 
levels of experience and consultation knowledge. 
<<< Insert Table 1 about here >>> 
None of the demographic factors vary significantly across treatment conditions in 
Experiment 2 (smallest p=0.18). However, we observe that some experience-related 
demographic factors are not randomly distributed across experimental conditions in Experiment 
1. More specifically, Bonferroni contrast tests reveal that participants in the treatment condition 
of low consultation requirement strictness and low underlying fraud risk hold significantly 
greater management fraud experience15 and public accounting experience16 than participants in 
some of the other three conditions (p<0.10). We control for this non-random distribution in our 
                                                 
15
 Means [standard deviations] for management fraud experience are as follows (different letters indicate 
significantly different means at p<0.10): CRS-High, UFR-High = 1.04 [1.40]a; CRS-Low, UFR-High = 1.08 [1.02]a; 
CRS-High, UFR-Low = 0.75 [1.29]a; CRS-Low, UFR-Low = 2.13 [1.75]b Hence, participants that were exposed to a 
lenient consultation requirement and low underlying fraud risk hold higher management fraud experience as 
compared to participants in the other three treatment conditions. 
16
 Means [standard deviations] for public accounting experience are as follows (different letters indicate significantly 
different means at p<0.10): CRS-High, UFR-High = 16.71 [9.43],a,b CRS-Low, UFR-High = 19.65 [6.88],a,b CRS-
High, UFR-Low = 14.42 [7.52],a CRS-Low, UFR-Low = 21.33 [11.09].b Hence, participants that were exposed to a 
lenient consultation requirement and low underlying fraud risk hold higher public accounting experience as 
compared to participants that read about a strict consultation requirement and low underlying fraud risk. 
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analyses of Experiment 1 by including public accounting experience as a covariate.17 None of the 
other demographic factors vary significantly across the treatment conditions in Experiment 1 
(p>0.4). 
Covariates  
To reduce overall experimental error, we include a number of covariates in the data 
analyses of both experiments. To determine which covariates to include, we examined the 
correlation matrix, revealing which measured variables are significantly associated with at least 
one of the two dependent variables.18 In Experiment 1, size is significantly associated with fraud 
risk assessment so we included it as a covariate in the analyses (i.e., Big-Four auditors generally 
assess fraud risk higher than medium-sized firm auditors). Furthermore, even though public 
accounting experience is not correlated with any of the dependent variables in Experiment 1, we 
include it as a covariate to control for possible confounding effects caused by its non-random 
distribution, as explained earlier. In Experiment 2, no demographic variables are significantly 
associated with the dependent variables.  
Manipulation Checks 
Consultation Requirement Strictness 
To verify the effectiveness of the consultation strictness manipulation in both 
experiments, participants answered two questions. First, they were asked if they agreed with the 
statement that the case required consultation with a technical expert if a client exhibited material 
fraud indicators (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). The Experiment 1 (2) mean response 
                                                 
17
 Management fraud experience correlates with public accounting experience (p<0.001), hence was not included as 
a covariate. 
18
 The following variables were investigated during preliminary testing: Age, gender, auditor rank (managers versus 
[near] partners, years of public accounting experience, firm size, management fraud experience, employee fraud 
experience, fraud consultation experience, and audit consultation experience. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics. 
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was 6.56 (6.79) for the ’strict requirement’ treatment and 2.10 (2.09) for the ’lenient 
requirement’ treatment. The means are significantly different in both experiments (p<0.01). 
Second, participants were asked if they agreed with the statement that the guidance provided by 
the expert in the case is binding and must be applied to the audit (1=strongly disagree, 
7=strongly agree). The Experiment 1 (2) mean response was 6.67 (6.71) for the ’strict 
requirement’ treatment and 1.30 (1.59) for the ‘lenient requirement’ treatment (p<0.01). Thus, 
we conclude that we successfully manipulated the strictness of the consultation requirement. 
Underlying Fraud Risk 
In Experiment 1, we asked participants if they agreed that the described scenario 
suggested that underlying client fraud risk in the case was high while abstracting from the 
current audit issue (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). The mean response was 6.20 for the 
high-risk treatment and 4.13 for the low-risk treatment. The two means are significantly different 
(p<0.01), suggesting a successful manipulation of underlying client fraud risk.19  
Deadline Pressure 
In Experiment 2, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which the case 
suggested that the pressure to complete the audit report was high (1=strongly disagree, 
7=strongly agree). The mean was 6.12 for the high deadline pressure condition and 1.24 for the 
low deadline pressure condition (p<0.01), suggesting an effective manipulation of deadline 
pressure.  
                                                 
19
 Note, this difference occurs even though all participants received the same description of the ambiguous, 
potentially fraudulent, conditions within the company. Thus, the difference between the two groups can be attributed 
to the presence/absence of red flags as manipulated in the experiment. While the “low” risk condition has a score of 
4.13, which might suggest more of a “moderate” risk, our pilot testing revealed that for the manipulation of the 
strictness condition to be salient to participants, the underlying risk of fraud had to be non-trivial. That is, in a truly 
low risk environment, the experiment becomes irrelevant. 
 23
Hypothesis Testing 
Two two-factor MANCOVAs and four individual ANCOVAs were used to test our 
hypotheses concerning consultation propensity and fraud risk assessment. Tables 2 and 3 report 
the results of Experiments 1 and 2, respectively, including descriptive statistics for the dependent 
variables per treatment condition (Panel A and B), the MANCOVA analyses (Panel C), and 
individual ANCOVA results for each of the two dependent variables (Panel D). 
<<< Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here >>> 
Hypothesis 1 
H1 predicts that consultation propensity and fraud risk assessment will be higher when 
the consultation requirement is strict. In both experiments, we find an overall significant main 
effect for the strictness of the consultation requirement on both dependent variables (Experiment 
1: p=0.09; Experiment 2: p=0.00; see MANCOVA results in Panel C of Tables 2 and 3).  
With respect to propensity to consult, descriptive statistics in Panels B of Tables 2 and 3 
reveal that the mean in the ‘strict requirement’ condition is higher than the mean of the ‘lenient 
requirement’ condition in both experiments (adjusted means in Experiment 1: 72.82 vs. 60.50; 
raw means in Experiment 2: 82.12 vs. 57.74). As seen in the ANCOVA results shown in Panel D 
of Table 2 and 3, this difference is significant in Experiment 1 (p=0.05) and Experiment 2 
(p=0.00), providing support for H1 with regard to consultation propensity. However, given the 
significant interaction between consultation requirement strictness and deadline pressure in 
Experiment 2 (Table 3, Panel D, p=0.08), the significant main effect needs to be interpreted with 
caution. We return to this issue when testing Hypothesis 3. 
Turning now to the fraud risk assessment, Panel A in Tables 2 and 3 show that the mean 
in the mandatory and binding condition is higher than the mean of the advisory and non-binding 
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condition in both experiments (adjusted means in Experiment 1: 65.57 vs. 58.09; raw means in 
Experiment 2: 69.04 vs. 59.81). Consistent with H1, auditors’ fraud risk assessment in the 
stricter condition is significantly higher than in the lenient condition in Experiment 1 (p=0.06) 
and Experiment 2 (p=0.03) (see ANCOVA results in Panel D of Tables 2 and 3). Thus, H1 is 
supported for the fraud risk assessment.  
Since we find evidence that generally supports H1, we now examine whether rank affects 
how the auditors respond to the strictness of the consultation requirement.20 Since our sample 
size and cell distribution does not allow for inclusion of rank as a factor in the current analysis, 
we run a separate MANCOVA (not tabulated) and separate ANCOVAs for the two subsamples 
(managers versus partners plus senior managers). Statistical results from our ANCOVA are 
presented in aggregate form in Table 4, Panel A.21  
<<< Insert Table 4 about here >>> 
The effect of consultation requirement strictness on consultation propensity is positive 
and significant for managers (Experiment 1: 57.43 vs. 74.39, p=0.07; Experiment 2: 52.19 vs. 
78.95, p=0.00). For partners and senior managers, the main effect is positive and significant in 
                                                 
20
 The limited sample size of medium-sized firm auditors does not allow us to also split the sample by firm size. 
However, we conducted supplemental analyses with Big-Four auditors only (including significant covariates 
following the same procedure of preliminary covariate testing as reported previously). Results (not tabulated) show 
that the main effects of the strictness of the consultation requirement on consultation propensity (Experiment 1: 
p=0.07; Experiment 2: p=0.00) and fraud risk assessment (Experiment 1: p=0.06; Experiment 2: p=0.01) hold in 
both experiments.  
21
 Before conducting rank-specific analyses for Experiment 1 and 2 data, we followed the same procedure of 
preliminary covariate testing as reported previously. First, given the previously reported non-random distribution of 
public accounting experience across treatment conditions in Experiment 1, we include this covariate in all separate 
analyses of Experiment 1 data. In addition, for (near-) partners, we found that firm size has a significant association 
with fraud risk assessment (p=0.02), which we therefore include in the respective MANCOVA and ANCOVA 
analyses in Experiment 1. For managers, we include employee fraud experience as a covariate in Experiment 1, 
since it is associated with fraud risk assessment (p=0.03). In Experiment 2, for (near-) partners, fraud consultation 
experience is associated with fraud risk assessment (p=0.02). For managers, management fraud experience is 
associated with fraud risk assessment (p=0.09). 
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Experiment 2 (62.05 vs. 84.45, p=0.01), whereas in Experiment 1, it is not significant (p=0.26).22 
With respect to fraud risk assessment, it appears that the main effect of consultation requirement 
strictness observed for the complete sample holds only for partners and near-partners in 
Experiment 2 (57.86 vs. 71.46, p=0.02). The main effect is not significant in Experiment 1 
(p=0.10).23 Managers’ fraud risk assessment is not affected by the strictness of the consultation 
requirement in either experiment, either as a main or interaction effect (all p’s>0.30). That is, 
while managers respond in the desired manner to the heightened standard strictness by itself, 
partners/near-partners exhibit a potentially undesirable behavior by simultaneously increasing 
their fraud risk assessment, possibly to further motivate their increased need for consultation. 
Mediation Analysis 
In the theory development, we suggest that in response to a strict requirement, auditors 
are motivated to adjust their assessment of fraud risk upwards, possibly to justify an increased 
consultation propensity (a strategic choice) or because the stricter formulation heightens their 
attention toward the risk of fraud (a bias). This raises the possibility that the positive effect of 
consultation requirement strictness on fraud risk assessment is mediated by consultation 
propensity (see RQ1). Employing the complete sample, we run a mediation analysis to test this 
possibility as shown in Table 5.  
<<< Insert Table 5 about here >>> 
If auditors’ inherent preference to share responsibility with a technical expert is the 
primary driver of their increased fraud risk assessment, the effect of strictness on fraud risk 
assessment should be mediated by consultation propensity, i.e., the effect of strictness on the 
                                                 
22
 As will be discussed in more detail as part of the Hypothesis 2 results, the strictness of the consultation 
requirement interacts with underlying fraud risk on (near) partners’ consultation propensity. 
23
 Again, as will be discussed in more detail later, the strictness of the consultation requirement interacts with 
underlying fraud risk on (near) partners’ fraud risk assessment. 
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assessment of fraud would be less significant in an analysis that also controls for the auditor’s 
propensity to consult (see Baron and Kenny (1986) for a detailed explanation of mediation 
analysis). We find that the effect of consultation requirement strictness on fraud risk assessment 
is fully mediated by consultation propensity since the coefficient of consultation requirement 
strictness declines substantially (Experiment 1: from β=-0.19 to β=-0.09; Experiment 2: from 
β=-0.22 to -0.03). The originally significant effect shown in step 1 (Experiment 1: p=0.05; 
Experiment 2: p=0.02) becomes statistically insignificant (Experiment 1: p=0.29; Experiment 2: 
p=0.79), when controlling for consultation propensity, as shown in steps 3 and 4 (see Table 5). 
Sobel, Aroian and Goodman tests are all significant (see step 5 of Panels A and B), meaning that 
the indirect effect of consultation requirement strictness on fraud risk assessment via consultation 
propensity is significantly different from zero. These results suggest that in the presence of a 
strict versus lenient consultation requirement, auditors increase their fraud risk assessment as a 
result of their heightened willingness to consult while, rationally, neither the strictness of the 
consultation requirement nor an auditor’s consultation propensity should affect his/her fraud risk 
assessment. 
Hypothesis 2 
H2 predicts that the positive effect of consultation requirement strictness on fraud risk 
assessment and consultation propensity will be stronger when underlying client fraud risk is 
high. MANCOVA and ANCOVA results from Experiment 1 (Table 2, Panels C and D) reveal 
that neither the predicted interaction nor main effects of underlying client fraud risk are 
significant for the two dependent variables. Thus, the basic results of the experiment provide no 
support for H2.  
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In response to our second research question (RQ2), we next consider if there is a 
differential effect for managers and partners/near-partners (i.e., senior managers) by analyzing 
each rank-group separately.24 We find that partners/near-partners exhibit a significant interaction 
between consultation requirement strictness and the underlying fraud risk for fraud risk 
assessment (p=0.07) and consultation propensity (p=0.09, Table 4, Panel A). Bonferroni pairwise 
mean comparison tests of the responses by partners/near-partners (Table 4, Panel B) and the 
interaction plot (Figure 1, Panel A) reveal that the positive effect of the strictness of the 
consultation requirement on auditors’ fraud risk assessment is significant when client fraud risk 
is high (p<0.10) but not significant when client fraud risk is low (p=1.00). For consultation 
propensity, Bonferroni mean comparisons are not significant (Table 4, Panel C), but the 
interaction pattern is similar as for fraud risk assessment (Figure 1, Panel B). For managers, the 
interaction effect is not significant for either the fraud risk assessment (p=0.81) or propensity to 
consult (p=0.74, Table 4, Panel A). Instead, as previously discussed, managers increase their 
consultation propensity (but not fraud risk assessment) in response to a stricter consultation 
requirement regardless of the underlying fraud risk, as discussed earlier.  
<<< Insert Figure 1 about here >>> 
While our primary tests do not support H2 directly, additional analysis of the results for 
Experiment 1 reveals that H2 is supported for high-ranking auditors (i.e., partners and senior 
managers) but not managers. Possible explanations for this result will be reviewed in the 
discussion section. 
 
                                                 
24
 We also conduct supplementary analyses for Big-Four auditors only (not tabulated). The interaction effect of 
consultation requirement strictness and underlying fraud risk on both dependent variables is not significant (as is the 
case for the complete sample), but underlying fraud risk is positively associated with auditors’ fraud risk 
assessment—a desired effect we did not observe for the complete sample. 
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Hypothesis 3 
In Experiment 2, we test whether deadline pressure moderates the effect of consultation 
requirement strictness on fraud risk assessment and consultation propensity. H3 predicts that an 
increase in deadline pressure will strengthen the positive effect of consultation requirement 
strictness on the two dependent variables. MANCOVA and ANCOVA results reveal that 
deadline pressure by itself does not have a significant effect on either fraud risk assessments or 
consultation propensity (Table 3, Panels C and D). However, individual ANCOVAs (Table 3, 
Panel D) indicate that consultation requirement strictness and deadline pressure interact in their 
effect on consultation propensity (p=0.08) but not fraud risk assessment (p=0.94). Bonferroni 
pairwise mean comparisons (Table 3, Panel E) and the interaction plot (Figure 2, Panel A) show 
that the consultation requirement strictness effect on consultation propensity is significant when 
deadline pressure is high (p<0.001) but not significant when deadline pressure is low (p>0.30). 
This finding partially supports H3, as the positive effect of consultation requirement strictness on 
consultation propensity is significant only in the presence of high deadline pressure, while its 
effect on fraud risk assessment is positive, regardless of deadline pressure. 
<<< Insert Figure 2 about here >>> 
We again consider differential responses across ranks by examining whether managers 
respond differently to deadline pressure than partners and senior managers by analyzing each 
group separately (Table 4, Panel A).25 First, we find that the previously discussed interaction 
effect of consultation requirement strictness and deadline pressure on consultation propensity 
holds for managers (p<0.10, Table 4, Panel D for pairwise mean comparisons and Figure 2, 
                                                 
25
 Supplementary analyses (not tabulated) reveal that the interaction effect of consultation requirement strictness and 
deadline pressure does not hold for the Big-Four auditors only subsample. Big-Four auditors increase their 
consultation propensity and fraud risk assessment in response to a stricter requirement regardless of deadline 
pressure. 
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Panel B for the interaction plot) but not for partners/near-partners (p>0.30). Partners/near-
partners increase their consultation propensity in response to a strict consultation requirement 
(p<0.05) regardless of deadline pressure. Second, we find that fraud risk assessments of 
managers are overall positively affected by deadline pressure (p<0.10), whereas partners/near-
partners adjust their fraud risk assessment downward under high deadline pressure (p<0.10).  
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this study was to examine auditors’ judgments in response to a requirement to 
consult with technical experts on a difficult audit matter. We use the context of potential fraud at 
a client because of recent standards adopted in the Netherlands. We specifically examine the 
question of whether the strictness of the consultation requirement affects auditors’ judgments 
about fraud risk and the likelihood that they will raise the issue with a technical expert within the 
firm. We predicted that the strictness of the requirement would increase auditors’ propensity to 
consult but also the assessment of fraud risk, whether due to bias or strategic reasons. We further 
argued that this effect would be greatest when a client exhibits underlying indications of fraud 
and when deadline pressure is tight.  
Our findings suggest that the strictness of the consultation requirement positively affects 
both fraud risk assessment and consultation propensity. Taken together, these results provide 
support that auditors generally respond positively to a strict consultation requirement. When they 
are told that consultation is required and binding, rather than advisory and non-binding, they are 
more likely to adhere to the requirement, particularly under conditions of high client fraud risk 
and tight deadline pressure. More important and potentially worrisome is the finding that 
auditors increase their fraud risk assessment when confronted with a stricter requirement, 
possibly in order to justify their desire to call in assistance and/or share responsibility.  
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Further, we observed that managers and partners/near-partners respond differently to 
variations in underlying fraud risk and deadline pressure. First, while audit managers increase 
their willingness to consult and fraud risk assessment in response to a stricter consultation 
requirement, the willingness of partners and senior managers to consult is not affected by the 
strictness of the requirement, unless client risk is high. This result may suggest that partners, 
whose equity investment in the firm is most at risk in the event of litigation, will only increase 
their fraud risk assessment and consultation propensity when dealing with a client that has 
obvious and observable warning signs of fraud. Meanwhile, managers respond positively to the 
strictness of the consultation requirement, regardless of the underlying fraud risk.26  
Second, managers increase their fraud risk assessment in response to tighter deadline 
pressure, while near-partners and partners reduce their fraud risk assessment. We suggest that 
managers’ and partners’ differential responses toward deadline pressure can be explained by 
rank-dependent motivations. Managers may view an increase in deadline pressure as a reason to 
bring in a technical expert and, to justify this desire, they increase their fraud risk assessment. 
Subsequently, in the presence of deadline pressure, a strict consultation requirement is even more 
effective for managers’ consultation propensity. On the other hand, partners respond negatively 
to deadline pressure in their fraud risk assessment. Since they are responsible for avoiding cost 
and time overruns, an increase in deadline pressure may activate motivated processing of the 
available information and, as a result, they underestimate the current risk of fraud in order to 
meet their initial goal. We recommend future research to further investigate how differential 
pressures across rank may influence auditor judgment. 
                                                 
26
 An alternative explanation for rank-dependent results may be differential levels of task knowledge, although this 
explanation is less likely, given the generally high level of experience among all study participants. 
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Third, managers appear to be more sensitive to time pressure than partners/near-partners 
when making judgments that could involve potentially time-consuming consultation. Unless 
deadline pressure is high, they are unaffected by the strictness of the consultation standard. An 
explanation may be that they wish to complete the engagement on time and within budget but 
when confronted by time pressure they prefer to consult an expert to justify potential delays in 
completing the audit. We do not observe the predicted spillover effect on fraud risk assessment. 
Partners/near partners respond consistently positively to the strictness of the standard in their 
willingness to consult and their fraud risk assessment. 
Some limitations to this study beyond those inherent with any experimental research 
should be mentioned. First, the consultation requirement used in the Netherlands was 
implemented in public accounting firms in 2007. At the time of data collection, some auditors 
may have anticipated the specific implementation of the requirement with their firms, which may 
have led to confusion among participants when being confronted with a consultation requirement 
strictness manipulation not in line with their own expectations. However, discussions with the 
participating firms revealed that there was still a high level of ambiguity with regard to the exact 
implementation of the standard at the time of study. More importantly, a successful manipulation 
check provides assurance that participants internalized the respective treatment.  
Second, as mentioned in a previous footnote, we chose to consider the extreme cases of a 
combined construct (i.e., mandatory and binding vs. advisory and non-binding) because the 
Dutch audit practitioners we discussed the case design with felt it was illogical to implement the 
two other combinations (i.e., mandatory and non-binding; advisory and binding). While the 
mixed cases could exist in theory, the auditors with whom we discussed the issue did not feel 
that they would arise naturally in the profession, so the two theoretical constructs are essentially 
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aligned by default. A limitation of this choice is that it does not allow us to deduce whether 
observed effects are driven by the fact that consultation is required or the fact that the specialist’s 
advice is binding. Third, in the experiment, we did not mention the issue of consultation costs, so 
we are unaware of the extent to which auditors’ judgments would have been influenced by a 
variation in costs and cost allocation (e.g., treating the costs of the consultation department as 
overhead within the firm or as a cost to be charged to specific clients). As previously noted by 
Asare and Wright (2004), cost considerations may further influence auditors’ willingness to 
consult and, hence, their fraud risk assessment.  
The consultation requirement was developed in order to increase consultation 
willingness, so on one hand, this study demonstrates the standard’s effectiveness when 
formulated in a strict manner. However, an important question is whether the audit profession 
always wants auditors to share responsibility. While the decision to seek advice should be driven 
by the seriousness of the issue at hand, our study results show that it is also affected by the extent 
to which consultation is mandatory and binding. Researchers and regulators should pay attention 
to auditors’ increased willingness to ‘pass the buck’. Another important concern raised by the 
results of this study is that a strict consultation requirement appears to offer auditors an incentive 
to increase their fraud risk assessment for the wrong reasons, which could potentially lead to 
serious judgment bias and inefficient audits in the long run. This study demonstrates that the 
formulation of a standard may create adverse incentives so regulators and audit firms should 
exercise caution when developing, formulating and implementing such procedures. 
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Panel A: Means and Standard Deviations across Ranks 
 
Variable  Group  n  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
             
Age  Overall Sample  207  40.04  8.32  28  63 
  Partner  65  46.06a  7.22  35  61 
  Senior Manager  51  40.37b  7.84  31  63 
  Manager  91  35.56c  6.17  28  61 
             
Public Accounting Experience1  Overall Sample  208  17.01  8.48  5  44 
  Partner  65  22.98a  6.98  11  39 
  Senior Manager  51  17.47b  8.08  7  41 
  Manager  92  12.54c  6.89  5  44 
             
Management Fraud Experience2  Overall Sample  207  1.17  1.36  0  5 
  Partner  65  1.71a  1.63  0  5 
  Senior Manager  50  1.00b  1.16  0  5 
  Manager  92  0.88b  1.15  0  5 
             
Employee Fraud Experience3  Overall Sample  207  1.90  1.66  0  5 
  Partner  65  2.51a  1.78  0  5 
  Senior Manager  50  2.04a  1.63  0  5 
  Manager  92  1.39b  1.43  0  5 
             
Fraud Consultation Experience4  Overall Sample  206  0.27  0.59  0  3 
  Partner  64  0.41a  0.66  0  3 
  Senior Manager  50  0.18a,b  0.56  0  3 
  Manager  92  0.22b  0.53  0  3 
             
Audit Consultation Experience5  Overall Sample  204  2.34  .936  0  5 
  Partner  64  1.59a  0.87  0  3 
  Senior Manager  49  1.22a  0.85  0  3 
  Manager  91  1.23a  1.00  0  5 
             
a,b,c Items with the same letter are not significantly different. Items with different letters are significantly 
different at p<0.10 (using Bonferroni multiple pairwise comparison tests). 
1 We measured public accounting experience by assessing the number of years participants had worked as 
public accountants. 
2 “During your audit career, how often have you dealt with fraudulent financial reporting committed by 
management of your clients?” 0=Never, 1=Once, 2=Twice, 3=Three times, 4=Four times, 5=Five times or 
more. 
3 “During your audit career, how often have you dealt with misappropriation of assets committed by 
employees of your clients?” 0=Never, 1=Once, 2=Twice, 3=Three times, 4=Four times, 5=Five times or 
more. 
4 “During the past year, how often have you used your firm’s technical office for advice on fraud-related 
issues?” 0=Never, 1=Once, 2=Twice, 3=Three times, 4=Four times, 5=Five times or more. 
5 “During the past five years, how often have you used your firm’s technical office for advice on various audit 




Panel B: Frequencies and Percentages across Ranks 
 
    
Overall 
Sample  Partner  
Senior 
Manager5  Manager 
Variable  Response  n %  n %  n %  n % 
               
Firm size (0=NoBig4, 1=Big4)  Big4  163 78.4  48 73.8  45 88.2  70 76.1 
  NonBig4  45 21.6  17 26.2  6 11.8  22 23.9 
               
Gender (0=Male, 1=Female)  Male  182 87.5  62 95.4  46 90.2  74 80.4 
  Female  26 12.5  3 4.6  5 9.8  18 19.6 
               
Management Fraud Experience1  Never  86 41.3  19 29.2  22 43.1  45 48.9 
  Once  55 26.4  16 24.6  14 27.5  25 27.2 
  Twice  37 17.8  13 20.0  8 15.7  16 17.4 
  Three times  13 6.3  5 7.7  5 9.8  3 3.3 
  Four times  6 2.9  6 9.2  0 0  0 0 
  Five or more  10 4.8  6 9.2  1 2.0  3 3.3 
  Missing  1 0.5  0 0  1 2.0  0 0 
               
Employee Fraud Experience2  Never  40 19.2  9 13.8  7 13.7  24 26.1 
  Once  73 35.1  15 23.1  18 35.3  40 43.5 
  Twice  32 15.4  10 15.4  8 15.7  14 15.2 
  Three times  24 11.5  12 18.5  8 15.7  4 4.3 
  Four times  6 2.9  3 4.6  1 2.0  2 2.2 
  Five or more  32 15.4  16 24.6  8 15.7  8 8.7 
  Missing  1 0.5  0   1 2.0  0 0 
               
Fraud Consultation Experience3  Never  163 78.4  43 66.2  44 86.3  76 82.6 
  Once  34 16.3  17 26.2  4 7.8  13 14.1 
  Twice  6 2.9  3 4.6  1 2.0  2 2.2 
  Three times  3 1.4  1 1.5  1 2.0  1 1.1 
  Missing  2 1.0  1 1.5  1 2.0  0 0 
               
Audit Consultation Experience4  Never  28 13.5  4 6.2  8 15.7  16 17.4 
  1-5 times  110 52.9  30 46.2  27 52.9  53 57.6 
  6-10 times  39 18.8  18 27.7  9 17.6  12 13.0 
  11-20 times  23 11.1  12 18.5  5 9.8  6 6.5 
  21-30 times  3 1.4  64 98.5  0 0  3 3.3 
  More than 30  1 0.5  0 0  0 0  1 1.1 
  Missing  4 1.9  1 1.5  2 3.9  1 1.1 
1-4 All terms defined in Panel A. 
5
 At times in the paper we refer to (near)partners. This refers to partners and senior managers. 
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Panel C: Means and Standard Deviations across Firm Types 
 
Variable  Group  n  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
             
Age  Overall Sample  207  40.04  8.32  28  63 
  Big-Four  162  39.41**  7.81  28  63 
  Medium-Sized Firm  45  42.31**  9.70  31  61 
             
Public Accounting Experience1  Overall Sample  208  17.01  8.48  5  44 
  Big-Four  163  16.44*  8.16  5  41 
  Medium-Sized Firm  45  19.09*  9.35  8  44 
             
Management Fraud Experience2  Overall Sample  207  1.17  1.36  0  5 
  Big-Four  163  1.15  1.39  0  5 
  Medium-Sized Firm  44  1.23  1.29  0  5 
             
Employee Fraud Experience3  Overall Sample  207  1.90  1.66  0  5 
  Big-Four  163  1.98  1.73  0  5 
  Medium-Sized Firm  44  1.61  1.33  0  5 
             
Fraud Consultation Experience4  Overall Sample  206  0.27  0.59  0  3 
  Big-Four  162  0.24  0.57  0  3 
  Medium-Sized Firm  44  0.36  0.65  0  3 
             
Audit Consultation Experience5  Overall Sample  204  2.34  .936  0  5 
  Big-Four  160  0.24**  0.57  0  3 
  Medium-Sized Firm  44  1.57**  0.93  0  4 
1-5 All terms defined in Panel A. 
* Means are significantly different at p<0.10 




Panel D: Frequencies and Percentages across Firm Types 
 








Variable  Response  n %  n %  n % 
            
Rank (0=Managers, 1=(Near) Partners)  Managers  92 44.2  70 42.9  22 48.9 
  (Near) Partners  116 55.8  93 57.1  23 51.1 
            
Gender (0=Male, 1=Female)  Male  182 87.5  14
1 
86.5  41 91.1 
  Female  26 12.5  22 13.5  4 8.9 
            
Management Fraud Experience1   Never  86 41.3  70 42.9  16 35.6 
  Once  55 26.4  44 27.0  11 24.4 
  Twice  37 17.8  24 14.7  13 28.9 
  Three times  13 6.3  12 7.4  1 2.2 
  Four times  6 2.9  5 3.1  1 2.2 
  Five or more  10 4.8  8 4.9  2 4.4 
  Missing  1 0.5  0 0  1 2.2 
            
Employee Fraud Experience2  Never  40 19.2  32 19.6  8 17.8 
  Once  73 35.1  56 34.4  17 37.8 
  Twice  32 15.4  23 14.1  9 20.0 
  Three times  24 11.5  17 10.4  7 15.6 
  Four times  6 2.9  6 3.7  0 0 
  Five or more  32 15.4  29 17.8  3 6.7 
  Missing  1 0.5  0 0  1 2.2 
            
Fraud Consultation Experience3   Never  163 78.4  13
2 
81.0  31 68.9 
  Once  34 16.3  23 14.1  11 24.4 
  Twice  6 2.9  5 3.1  1 2.2 
  Three times  3 1.4  2 1.2  1 2.2 
  Missing  2 1.0  1 0.6  1 2.2 
            
Audit Consultation Experience4   Never  28 13.5  25 15.3  3 6.7 
  1-5 times  110 52.9  88 54.0  22 48.9 
  6-10 times  39 18.8  28 17.2  11 24.4 
  11-20 times  23 11.1  16 9.8  7 15.6 
  21-30 times  3 1.4  2 1.2  1 2.2 
  More than 30  1 0.5  1 0.6  0 0 
  Missing  4 1.9  3 1.8  1 2.2 




Experiment 1—The Effect of Consultation Requirement Strictness and Underlying Fraud 
Risk on Fraud Risk Assessment and Consultation Propensity  
 
Panel A: Fraud Risk Assessment a — Raw Means, Standard Deviations, and Adjusted 

















High  High  70.00  20.55  70.23  28 
 Low  60.83  16.40  60.91  24 
 Overall  65.77  19.13  65.57  52 
Low  High  56.92  17.84  56.80  26 
 Low  59.58  22.16  59.38  24 
 Overall  58.20  19.87  58.09  50 
Overall  High  63.70  20.22  63.51  54 
 Low  60.21  19.30  60.14  48 
 Overall  62.06  19.77  61.83  102 
a Fraud risk was assessed in response to the following question: “In your opinion, what is the probability that 
the described 2006 audit issue is an indicator of material fraud?” (0% = very low, 100% = very high) 
b
 Means are adjusted for covariates “Public Accounting Experience” and “Firm size” (Big4 auditors vs. 
medium-sized firm auditors). 
c
 Participants in the ‘strict requirement’ condition (CRS high) were told that consultation with a technical 
expert, in case fraud indicators are detected, is mandatory, that any advice received would be binding, and 
that additional testing must be reviewed by the expert. Participants in the ‘lenient requirement’ condition 
(CRS low) were told that they would decide themselves whether to seek advice from a technical expert or 
not, that any advice received would not be binding, and further review by the expert would not be required. 
d
 Underlying fraud risk was manipulated by varying opportunity, attitude and pressure factors for the client 
company. For example, in the high (low) UFR condition, management’s focus on internal controls is 
described as strong (limited), the client has (no) history of aggressive accounting, and many (few) audit 
adjustment have been proposed in prior year audits. 
 
 41
Panel B: Consultation Propensity a — Raw Means, Standard Deviations, and Adjusted 

















High  High  77.14  27.47  77.40  28 
 Low  67.50  27.23  68.24  24 
 Overall  72.69  27.52  72.82  52 
Low  High  60.77  30.58  60.43  26 
 Low  61.25  32.61  60.57  24 
 Overall  61.00  31.25  60.50  50 
Overall  High  69.26  29.90  68.92  54 
 Low  64.38  29.89  64.40  48 
 Overall  66.96  29.84  66.66  102 
a
 Consultation propensity was measured by asking participants the following question: “What is the 
probability that you would consult with the fraud advisor of your firm on the described audit issue?” (0% = 
very low, 100% = very high).  
b
 Means are adjusted for the covariates “Public Accounting Experience” (measured in years) and “Firm size” 
(Big4 auditors vs. medium-sized firm auditors). 
c
 See Panel A for a definition of consultation requirement strictness. 
d
 See Panel A for a definition of underlying fraud risk. 
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Panel C: Results of a 2x2 MANCOVA of Consultation Requirement Strictness (CRS) and 
Underlying Fraud Risk (UFR) on Fraud Risk Assessment and Consultation Propensity a 
 
Source of Variance  Wilks’ λ  F-Statistic  p-value 
       
Independent variables       
 CRS  0.95  2.52  0.09 
       
 UFR  0.99  0.46  0.63 
       
 CRS x UFR  0.98  1.23  0.30 
       
Covariates       
 Public Accounting Experience  0.99  0.39  0.68 
       
 Firm Size   0.91  4.94  0.01 
       
a  All terms defined in Panels A and B. 
 
Panel D: Results of individual 2x2 ANCOVAs of Consultation Requirement Strictness 
(CRS) and Underlying Fraud Risk (UFR) on Fraud Risk Assessment (FRA) and 
Consultation Propensity (CP) a 
 







Square  F-Statistic  p-value 
             
Model  FRA  5292.48  5  1058.50  2.97  0.02 
  CP  5010.13  5  1002.03  1.13  0.35 
             
Independent variables             
 CRS  FRA  1315.54  1  1315.54  3.70  0.06 
  CP  3567.52  1  3567.52  4.03  0.05 
             
 UFR  FRA  288.19  1  288.19  0.81  0.37 
  CP  517.26  1  517.26  0.59  0.45 
             
 CRS x UFR  FRA  886.57  1  886.57  2.49  0.12 
  CP  841.87  1  841.87  0.61  0.44 
             
Covariates             
 Public Acctng Experience  FRA  271.65  1  271.65  0.76  0.39 
  CP  307.68  1  307.68  0.35  0.56 
             
Firm Size  FRA  2560.32  1  2560.32  7.19  0.01b 
  CP  1.63  1  1.63  0.00  0.97 
             
Error  FRA  34175.16  96  355.99     
  CP  84947.71  96  884.87     
             
a All terms defined in Panels A and B. 
b
 Big4 auditors assess fraud risk higher than medium-sized firm auditors. 
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TABLE 3 
Experiment 2—The Effect of Consultation Requirement Strictness and Deadline Pressure 
on Fraud Risk Assessment and Consultation Propensity 
 
Panel A: Fraud Risk Assessment a—Raw Means and Standard Deviations by Consultation 














High  High  68.89  20.63  27 
 Low  69.20  20.40  25 
 Overall  69.04  20.32  52 
Low  High  60.00  21.02  25 
 Low  59.66  21.80  29 
 Overall  59.81  21.24  54 
Overall  High  64.62  21.10  52 
 Low  64.07  21.50  54 
 Overall  64.34  21.20  106 
a Fraud risk was assessed in response to the following question: “In your opinion, what 
is the probability that the described 2006 audit issue is an indicator of material 
fraud?” (0% = very low, 100% = very high) 
b
 Participants in the ‘strict requirement’ condition (CRS high) were told that 
consultation with a technical expert, in case fraud indicators are detected, is 
mandatory, that any advice received would be binding, and that additional testing 
must be reviewed by the expert. Participants in the ‘lenient requirement’ condition 
(CRS low) were told that they would decide themselves whether to seek advice from 
a technical expert or not, that any advice received would not be binding, and further 
review by the expert would not be required. 
c
 Deadline pressure was manipulated by varying the time available to report the results 




Panel B: Consultation Propensity a—Raw Means and Standard Deviations by Consultation 














High  High  88.15  16.42  27 
 Low  75.60  26.15  25 
 Overall  82.12  22.35  52 
Low  High  53.20  36.20  25 
 Low  60.34  31.79  29 
 Overall  57.74  33.61  53 
Overall  High  71.35  32.54  52 
 Low  67.41  30.04  54 
 Overall  69.34  31.20  106 
a Consultation propensity was measured by asking participants the following question: 
“What is the probability that you would consult with the fraud advisor of your firm 
on the described audit issue?” (0% = very low, 100% = very high).  
b
 See Panel A for a definition of consultation requirement strictness. 
c
 See Panel A for a definition of deadline pressure. 
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Panel C: Results of a 2x2 MANCOVA of Consultation Requirement Strictness (CRS) and 
Deadline Pressure (DP) on Fraud Risk Assessment and Consultation Propensity a 
 
Source of Variance  Wilks’ λ  F-Statistic  p-value 
       
Independent variables       
 CRS  0.83  10.16  0.00 
       
 DP  0.10  0.15  0.86 
       
 CRS x DP  0.96  2.06  0.13 
       
a  All terms defined in Panels A and B. 
 
 
Panel D: Results of Individual 2x2 ANCOVAs of Consultation Requirement Strictness 
(CRS) and Deadline Pressure (DP) on Fraud Risk Assessment (FRA) and Consultation 
Propensity (CP) a 
 







Square  F-Statistic  p-value 
             
Model  FRA  2256.56  3  752.19  1.71  0.17 
  CP  19389.81  3  6463.27  7.96  0.00 
             
Independent variables             
 CRS  FRA  2242.62  1  2242.62  5.09  0.03 
  CP  16633.96  1  16633.96  20.48  0.00 
             
 DP  FRA  0.01    0.01  0.00  0.10 
  CP  192.69  1  192.69  0.24  0.63 
             
 CRS x DP  FRA  2.84  1  2.84  0.01  0.94 
  CP  2559.49  1  2559.49  3.15  0.08 
             
Error  FRA  44947.22  102  110.66     
  CP  82863.96  102  812.39     
             
a  All terms defined in Panels A and B. 
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Panel E: Interaction of Consultation Requirement Strictness and Deadline Pressure on 
Consultation Propensity—Means and Bonferroni Pairwise Comparisons (p-values) 
 





Pressure  Mean  
High CRS/ 
High DP  
High CRS/ 
Low DP  
Low CRS/ 
High DP 
High  High  88.15       
High  Low  75.60  0.70     
Low  High  53.20  0.00  0.04   




Summary Results from ANCOVA Testing by Rank Split (Manager versus Partner/Near-
Partner)  
 
Panel A: F-Statistics (p-values)a, b 
 
    Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
IV  DV  Managers  
(Near) 
Partnersc  Managers  
(Near) 
Partnersc 
CRS   FRA  1.09 (0.30)  2.73 (0.10)  0.22 (0.64)  6.08 (0.02) 
  CP  3.60 (0.07)  1.32 (0.26)  9.71 (0.00)  8.68 (0.01) 
           
UFR   FRA  0.02 (0.88)  1.58 (0.21)     
  CP  0.11 (0.74)  1.47 (0.23)     
           
CRSxUFR  FRA  0.06 (0.81)  3.37 (0.07)     
  CP  0.11 (0.74)  2.93 (0.09)     
           
DP  FRA      2.92 (0.09)  3.26 (0.08) 
  CP      0.07 (0.80)  0.08 (0.79) 
           
CRSxDP  FRA      0.16 (0.69)  0.03 (0.87) 
  CP      3.10 (0.09)  0.83 (0.37) 
a  All terms defined in Tables 1 and 2. 
b Before conducting rank-specific analyses for Experiment 1 and 2 data, we followed the same procedure of preliminary 
covariate testing as reported previously. First, given the previously reported non-random distribution of public 
accounting experience across treatment conditions in Experiment 1, we include this covariate in all separate analyses 
of Experiment 1 data. In addition, for (near-) partners, we found that firm size has a significant association with 
fraud risk assessment (p=0.02), which we therefore include in the respective MANCOVA and ANCOVA analyses in 
Experiment 1. For managers, we include employee fraud experience as a covariate in Experiment 1, since it is 
associated with fraud risk assessment (p=0.03). In Experiment 2, for (near-) partners, fraud consultation experience is 
associated with fraud risk assessment (p=0.02). For managers, management fraud experience is associated with fraud 
risk assessment (p=0.09). 
c





Panel B: Experiment 1— (Near) Partners—Interaction of Consultation Requirement 
Strictness and Underlying Fraud Risk on Fraud Risk Assessment—Adjusted Means and 
Bonferroni Pairwise Comparisons (p-values) 
 











High UFR  
High CRS/ 
Low UFR  
Low CRS/ 
High UFR 
High  High  75.32  14       
High  Low  59.38  12  0.24     
Low  High  57.24  19  0.07  1.00   
Low  Low  60.37  15  0.25  1.00  1.00 
 
Panel C: Experiment 1— (Near) Partners—Interaction of Consultation Requirement 
Strictness and Underlying Fraud Risk on Consultation Propensity—Adjusted Means and 
Bonferroni Pairwise Comparisons (p-values) 
 










High UFR  
High CRS/ 
Low UFR  
Low CRS/ 
High UFR 
High  High  84.16  14       
High  Low  59.38  12  0.30     
Low  High  59.76  19  0.20  1.00   
Low  Low  64.25  15  0.48  1.00  1.00 
 
 
Panel D: Experiment 2—Managers—Interaction of Consultation Requirement Strictness 
and Deadline Pressure on Consultation Propensity—Adjusted Means and Bonferroni 
Pairwise Comparisons (p-values) 
 









High DP  
High CRS/ 
Low DP  
Low CRS/ 
High DP 
High  High  87.68  12       
High  Low  70.22  16  0.86     
Low  High  45.66  9  0.01  0.34   







Panel A: Experiment 1—Results of Mediation Analysis (Baron and Kenny 1986) 
 
Step 1 
Show that X (consultation requirement strictness) is correlated with Y (fraud risk assessment). 
 
Variable (n=102)  Coefficient  t-statistic  p-value  




-1.96  0.05  
 
Step 2 
Show that X (consultation requirement strictness) is correlated with the mediator M (consultation 
propensity).  
 
Variable (n=102)  Coefficient  t-statistic  p-value 




-2.01  0.05 
 
Steps 3 and 4 
Show that M (consultation propensity) affects Y (fraud risk assessment). To establish that M 
completely mediates the X-Y relationship, the effect of X on Y controlling for M should be zero. 
 
Variable (n=102)  Coefficient  t-statistic  p-value  










5.88  0.00  
 
Step 5 
Test whether the indirect effect of X (consultation requirement strictness) on Y (fraud risk 
assessment) via M (consultation propensity) is significantly different from zero. 
 
Sobel test statistic: -1.90; p=0.06 
Aroian test statistic: -1.88; p=0.06 




Panel B: Experiment 2— Results of Mediation Analysis (Baron and Kenny 1986) 
 
Step 1 
Show that X (consultation requirement strictness) is correlated with Y (fraud risk assessment). 
 
Variable (n=102)  Coefficient  t-statistic  p-value  




-2.28  0.02  
 
Step 2 
Show that X (consultation requirement strictness) is correlated with the mediator M (consultation 
propensity).  
 
Variable (n=102)  Coefficient  t-statistic  p-value 




-4.50  0.00 
 
Steps 3 and 4 
Show that M (consultation propensity) affects Y (fraud risk assessment). To establish that M 
completely mediates the X-Y relationship, the effect of X on Y controlling for M should be zero. 
 
Variable (n=102)  Coefficient  t-statistic  p-value  










5.08  0.00  
 
Step 5 
Test whether the indirect effect of X (consultation requirement strictness) on Y (fraud risk 
assessment) via M (consultation propensity) is significantly different from zero. 
 
Sobel test statistic: -3.37; p=0.00 
Aroian test statistic: -3.33; p=0.00 






Experiment 1—Interaction Plots 
 
Panel A: (Near) Partners—Interaction of Consultation Requirement Strictness and 





Panel B: (Near) Partners—Interaction of Consultation Requirement Strictness and 


































Experiment 2—Interaction Plots 
 
Panel A: Complete Sample—Interaction of Consultation Requirement Strictness and 




Panel B: Managers—Interaction of Consultation Requirement Strictness and Deadline 




























Low CRS High CRS
Low DP
High DP
Publications in the Report Series Research∗ in Management 
 




The Inefficient Use of Macroeconomic Information in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts in Emerging Markets 




Sole versus Shared Responsibility: Fraud Consultation and Auditor Judgment 





































                                                 
∗  A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1
 
 ERIM Research Programs: 
 LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
 ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT Marketing 
 F&A Finance and Accounting 
 STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship 
